Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Metaphysical Possibility: Metaphysical possibility is the strongest of the various types of possibility. It cannot be judged within the framework of our actual world. Weaker types are logical possibility and physical possibility. See also Possibility, Logical Possibility._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Christopher Peacocke on Metaphysical Possibility - Dictionary of Arguments
I 19 Name/Identification/Necessary/Metaphysically possible /Epistemic/Kripke/Peacocke: E.g. assumed one could fix the reference of the name Bright by the fact that it intended to refer to the man who invented the wheel. Kripke: then still the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright has never invented the wheel". Cf. >Julius example, >Reference, >Possibility, >Necessity, >Indeterminacy, >Names. I 188/189 Possible world/Description/Peacocke: there is no specific individual relation between the use of the expression "the F" and the thing which is F. >Possible worlds, >Descriptions, >Predication. ((s) Otherwise certain aspects would be a priori). Identity between worlds/Peacocke: even in quite similar worlds identity is a relation for itself. >Cross world identity, >Identity. Identity between relations to the perceiving subject in various worlds: pointless to claim. >Unabmiguity, >Identification, >Perception._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
||
> Counter arguments against Peacocke
> Counter arguments in relation to Metaphysical Possibility
